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Abstract
Current measures of machine intelligence are ei-
ther difficult to evaluate or lack the ability to test
a robot’s problem-solving capacity in open worlds.
We propose a novel evaluation framework based on
the formal notion ofMacGyver Testwhich provides
a practical way for assessing the resilience and re-
sourcefulness of artificial agents.
1 Introduction
Consider a situation when your only suit is covered in lint and
you do not own a lint remover. Being resourceful, you rea-
son that a roll of duct tape might be a good substitute. You
then solve the problem of lint removal by peeling a full turn’s
worth of tape and re-attaching it backwards onto the roll to
expose the sticky side all around the roll. By rolling it over
your suit, you can now pick up all the lint. This type of ev-
eryday creativity and resourcefulness is a hallmark of human
intelligence and best embodied in the 1980s television series
MacGyver which featured a clever secret service agent who
used common objects around him like paper clips and rub-
ber bands in inventive ways to escape difficult life-or-death
situations.1
Yet, current proposals for tests of machine intelligence do
not measure abilities like resourcefulness or creativity, even
though this is exactly what is needed for artificial agents
such as space-exploration robots, search-and-rescue agents,
or even home and elder-care helpers to be more robust, re-
silient, and ultimately autonomous.
In this paper we thus propose an evaluation framework
for machine intelligence and capability consisting of prac-
tical tests for inventiveness, resourcefulness, and resilience.
Specifically, we introduce the notion ofMacGyver Test (MT)
as a practical alternative to the Turing Test intended to ad-
vance research.
1As a society, we place a high value on our human ability to
solve novel problems and remain resilient while doing so. Beyond
the media, our patent system and peer-reviewed publication systems
are additional examples of us rewarding creative problem solving
and elegance of solution.
2 Background: Turing Test and its Progeny
Alan Turing asked whether machines could produce observ-
able behavior (e.g., natural language) that we (humans)would
say required thought in people [Turing, 1950]. He suggested
that if an interrogator was unable to tell, after having a
long free-flowing conversation with a machine whether she
was dealing with a machine or a person, then we can con-
clude that the machine was “thinking”. Turing did not in-
tend for this to be a test, but rather a prediction of sorts
[Cooper and Van Leeuwen, 2013]. Nevertheless, since Tur-
ing, others have developed tests for machine intelligence that
were variations of the so-called Turing Test to address a com-
mon criticism that it was easy to deceive the interrogator.
Levesque et al. designed a reading comprehension test, en-
titled the Winograd Schema Challenge, in which the agent
is presented a question having some ambiguity in the ref-
erent of a pronoun or possessive adjective. The question
asks to determine the referent of this ambiguous pronoun
or possessive adjective, by selecting one of two choices
[Levesque et al., 2012]. Feigenbaum proposed a variation of
the Turing Test in which a machine can be tested against a
team of subject matter specialists through natural language
conversation [Feigenbaum, 2003]. Other tests attempted to
study a machine’s ability to produce creative artifacts and
solve novel problems [Boden, 2010; Bringsjord et al., 2001;
Bringsjord and Sen, 2016; Riedl, 2014].
Extending capabilities beyond linguistic and creative, Har-
nad’s Total Turing Test (T3) suggested that the range of ca-
pabilities must be expanded to a full set of robotic capaci-
ties found in embodied systems [Harnad, 1991]. Schweizer
extended the T3 to incorporate species evolution and de-
velopment over time and proposed the Truly Total Turing
Test (T4) to test not only individual cognitive systems but
whether as a species the candidate cognitive architecture in
question is capable of long-term evolutionary achievement
[Schweizer, 2012].
Finding that the Turing Test and its above-mentioned vari-
ants were not helping guide research and development, many
proposed a task-based approach. Specific task-based goals
were designed couched as toy problems that were representa-
tive of a real-world task [Cohen, 2005]. The research com-
munities benefited greatly from this approach and focused
their efforts towards specific machine capabilities like object
recognition, automatic scheduling and planning, scene under-
standing, localization and mapping, and even game-playing.
Many public competitions and challenges emerged that tested
the machine’s performance in applying these capabilities –
from image recognition contests and machine learning con-
tests. Some of these competitions even tested embodiment
and robotic capacities, while combining multiple tasks. For
example, the DARPA Robotics Challenge tested a robot’s
ability to conduct tasks relevant to remote operation includ-
ing turning valves, using a tool to break through a concrete
panel, opening doors, remove debris blocking entryways.
Unfortunately, the Turing Test variants as well as the task-
based challenges are not sufficient as true measures of au-
tonomy in the real-world. Autonomy requires a multi-modal
ability and an integrated embodied system to interact with
the environment, and achieve goals while solving open-world
problems with the limited resources available. None of these
tests are interested in measuring this sort of intelligence and
capability, the sort that is most relevant from a practical
standpoint.
3 The MacGyver Evaluation Framework
The proposed evaluation framework, based on the idea
of MacGyver-esque creativity, is intended to answer the
question whether embodied machines can generate, execute
and learn strategies for identifying and solving seemingly-
unsolvable real-world problems. The idea is to present an
agent with a problem that is unsolvable with the agent’s ini-
tial knowledge and observing the agent’s problem solving
processes to estimate the probability that the agent is being
creative: if the agent can think outside of its current context,
take some exploratory actions, and incorporate relevant envi-
ronmental cues and learned knowledge to make the problem
tractable (or at least computable) then the agent has the gen-
eral ability to solve open-world problems more effectively.2
This type of problem solving framework is typically used
in the area of automated planning for describing various sorts
of problems and solution plans and is naturally suited for
defining a MacGyver-esque problem and a creative solution
strategy. We are now ready to formalize various notions of
the MacGyver evaluation framework.
3.1 Preliminaries - Classical Planning
We define L to be a first order language with predicates
p(t1, . . . , tn) and their negations ¬p(t1, . . . , tn) , where ti
represents terms that can be variables or constants. A predi-
cate is grounded if and only if all of its terms are constants.
We will use classical planning notions of a planning domain
in L that can be represented as Σ = (S,A, γ), where S rep-
resents the set of states, A is the set of actions and γ are the
transition functions. A classical planning problem is a triple
P = (Σ, s0, g), where s0 is the initial state and g is the goal
state. A plan pi is any sequence of actions and a plan pi is a
solution to the planning problem if g ⊆ γ(s0, pi). We also
2Note that the proposed MT is a subset of Harnad’s T3, but in-
stead of requiring robots to do “everything real people do”, MT is
focused on requiring robots to exhibit resourcefulness and resilience.
MT is also a subset of Schweizer’s T4 which expands T3 with the
notion of species-level intelligence.
consider the notion of state reachability and the set of all suc-
cessor states Γˆ(s), which defines the set of states reachable
from s.
3.2 A MacGyver Problem
To formalize a MacGyver Problem (MGP), we define a uni-
verse and then a world within this universe. The world de-
scribes the full set of abilities of an agent and includes those
abilities that the agent knows about and those of which it is
unaware. We can then define an agent subdomain as repre-
senting a proper subset of the world that is within the aware-
ness of the agent. An MGP then becomes a planning problem
defined in the world, but outside the agent’s current subdo-
main.
Definition 1 (Universe). We first define a Universe U =
(S,A, γ) as a classical planning domain representing all as-
pects of the physical world perceivable and actionable by any
and all agents, regardless of capabilities. This includes all
the allowable states, actions and transitions in the physical
universe.
Definition 2 (World). We define a world Wt = (St, At, γt)
as a portion of the Universe U corresponding to those aspects
that are perceivable and actionable by a particular species t
of agent. Each agent species t ∈ T has a particular set of
sensors and actuators allowing agents in that species to per-
ceive a proper subset of states, actions or transition functions.
Thus, a world can be defined as follows:
W
t = {(St, At, γt) | ((St ⊆ S) ∨ (At ⊆ A) ∨ (γt ⊆ γ))
∧ ¬((St = S) ∧ (At = A) ∧ (γt = γ))}
Definition 3 (Agent Subdomain). We next define an agent
Σti = (S
t
i , A
t
i, γ
t
i ) of type t, as a planning subdomain corre-
sponding to the agent’s perception and action within its world
Wt. In other words, the agent is not fully aware of all of
its capabilities at all times, and the agent domain Σti corre-
sponds to the portion of the world that the agent is perceiving
and acting at time i.
Σti = {(S
t
i , A
t
i, γ
t
i ) | ((S
t
i ⊂ S
t)∨(Ati ⊂ A
t)∨(γti ⊂ γ
t))
∧ ¬((Sti = S
t) ∧ (Ati = A
t) ∧ (γti = γ
t))}
Definition 4 (MacGyver Problem). We define a MacGyver
Problem (MGP) with respect to an agent t, as a planning
problem in the agent’s world Wt that has a goal state g that
is currently unreachable by the agent. Formally, an MGP
PM = (Wt, s0, g), where:
• s0 ∈ Sti is the initial state of the agent
• g is a set of ground predicates
• Sg = {s ∈ S|g ⊆ s}
Where g ⊆ s′, ∀s′ ∈ ΓˆWt(s0) \ ΓˆΣt
i
(s0)
It naturally follows that in the context of a world Wt, the
MGP PM is a classical planning problem which from the
agent’s current perspective is unsolvable. We can reformu-
late the MGP as a language recognition problem to be able to
do a brief complexity analysis.
Definition 5 (MGP-EXISTENCE).Given a set of statements
D of planning problems, let MGP-EXISTENCE(D) be the
set of all statements P ∈ D such that P represents a Mac-
Gyver Problem PM , without any syntactical restrictions.
Theorem 1 MGP-EXISTENCE is decidable.
Proof. The proof is simple. The number of possible states in
the agent’s subdomainΣti and the agent’s worldW
t are finite.
So, it is possible to do a brute-force search to see whether
a solution exists in the agent’s world but not in the agent’s
initial domain. 
Theorem 2 MGP-EXISTENCE is EXPSPACE-complete.
Proof. (Membership). An MGP amounts to looking to see if
the problem is a solvable problem in the agent-domain. Upon
concluding it is not solvable, the problem then becomes one
of determining if it is a solvable problem in the world cor-
responding to the agent’s species. Each of these problems
are PLAN-EXISTENCE problems, which are in EXPSPACE
for the unrestricted case [Ghallab et al., 2004]. Thus, MGP-
EXISTENCE is in EXPSPACE.
(Hardness). We can reduce the classical planning prob-
lem P (Σ, s0, g) to an MGP (PLAN-EXISTENCE≤pm MGP-
EXISTENCE), by defining a new world W. To define a new
world, we extend the classical domain by one state, defining
the new state as a goal state, and adding actions and transi-
tions from every state to the new goal state. We also set the
agent domain to be the same as the classical planning domain.
Now, P (Σ, s0, g) ∈ PLAN-EXISTENCE iff P (W, s0, g) ∈
MGP-EXISTENCE for agent with domain Σ. Thus, MGP-
EXISTENCE is EXPSPACE-hard. 
3.3 Solving a MacGyver Problem
From Theorems 1 and 2, we know that, while possible, it is
intractable for an agent to know whether a given problem is
an MGP. From an agent’s perspective, solving an MGP is like
solving any planning problemwith the additional requirement
to sense or learn some previously unknown state, transition
function or action. Specifically, solving an MGP will involve
performing some actions in the environment, making obser-
vations, extending and contracting the agent’s subdomain and
exploring different contexts.
Solution Strategies
Definition 6 (Agent Domain Modification). A domain mod-
ification Σt∗j involves either a domain extension or a domain
contraction3. A domain extension Σt+j of an agent is an
Agent-subdomain at time j that is in the agent’s world Wt
but not in the agent’s subdomain Σti in the previous time i,
such that Σti  Σ
t
j . The agent extends its subdomain through
sensing and perceiving its environment and its own self - e.g.,
the agent can extend its domain by making an observation, re-
ceiving advice or an instruction or performing introspection.
Formally,
Σt+j = {(S
t+
j , A
t+
j , γ
t+
j ) | (S
t+
j ⊂ S
t \ Sti )
∨ (At+j ⊂ A
t \Ati) ∨ (γ
t+
j ⊂ γ
t \ γti )}
3In the interest of brevity we will only consider domain exten-
sions for now.
The agent subdomain that results from a domain extension
is Σtj = Σ
t
i ∪ Σ
t+
j
A domain modification set ∆Σt
i
= {Σt∗1 ,Σ
t∗
2 , . . . ,Σ
t∗
n } is
a set of n domain modifications on subdomainΣti. Let Σ
t
∆ be
the subdomain resulting from applying∆Σt
i
on Σti
Definition 7 (Strategy and Domain-Modifying Strategy). A
strategy is a tuple ω = (pi,∆) of a plan pi and a set ∆ of
domain modifications. A domain-modifying strategy ωC in-
volves at least one domain modification, i.e.,∆ 6= ∅.
Definition 8 (Context). A context is a tuple Ci = (Σi, si)
representing the agent’s subdomain and state at time i.
We are now ready to define an insightful strategy as a set of
actions and domain modifications that the agent needs to per-
form to allow for the goal state of the problem to be reachable
by the agent.
Definition 9 (Insightful Strategy). Let Ci = (Σ
t
i, s0) be
the agent’s current context. Let PM = (Wt, s0, g) be an
MGP for the agent in this context. An insightful strategy is
a domain-modifying strategy ωI = (piI ,∆I) which when
applied in Ci results in a context Cj = (Σ
t
j , sj), where
Σtj = Σ
t
∆I such that g ⊆ s
′, ∀s′ ∈ ΓˆΣtj (sj).
Formalizing the insightful strategy in this way is somewhat
analogous to the moment of insight that is reached when a
problem becomes tractable (or in our definition computable)
or when solution plan becomes feasible. Specifically, solving
a problem involves some amount of creative exploration and
domain extensions and contractions until the point when the
agent has all the information it needs within its subdomain to
solve the problem as a classical planning problem, and does
not need any further domain extensions. We can alternatively
define an insightful strategy in terms of when the goal state is
not only reachable, but a solution can be discovered in poly-
nomial time. We will next review simple toy examples to
illustrate the concepts discussed thus far.
4 Operationalizing a MacGyver Problem
We will consider two examples that will help operationalize
the formalism presented thus far. The first is a modification
of the popular Blocks World planning problem. The second
is a more practical task of tightening screws, however, with
the caveat that certain common tools are unavailable and the
problem solver must improvise. We specifically discuss var-
ious capabilities that an agent must possess in order to over-
come the challenges posed by the examples.
4.1 Toy Example: Block-and-Towel World
Consider an agent tasked with moving a block from one lo-
cation to another which the agent will not be able to ex-
ecute without first discovering some new domain informa-
tion. Let the agent subdomain Σ consist of a set of locations
l = {L1, L2, L3}, two objects o = {T,B} a towel and a
block, and a function locationOf : o → l representing the
location of object o. Suppose the agent is aware of the fol-
lowing predicates and their negations:
• at(o, l): an object o is at location l
• near(l): the agent is near location l
• touching(o): the agent is touching object o
• holding(o): the agent is holding the object o
We define a set of actions A in the agent domain as follows:
• reach(o, l): Move the robot arm to near the object o
precond: {at(o, l)}
effect: {near(l)}
• grasp(o, l): Grasp object o at l
precond: {near(l), at(o, l)}
effect: {touching(o)}
• lift(o, l): Lift object o from l
precond: {touching(o), at(o, l)}
effect: {holding(o),¬at(o, l),¬near(l)}
• carryTo(o, l): Carry object o to l
precond: {holding(o)}
effect: {¬holding(o), at(o, l)}
• release(o, l): Release object o at l
precond: {touching(o), at(o, l)}
effect: {¬touching(o), at(o, l)}
Given an agent domain Σ, and a start state s0 as defined
below, we can define the agent contextC = (Σ, s0) as a tuple
with the agent domain and the start state.
s0 = {at(T, L1), at(B,L2),¬holding(T ),¬holding(B),
¬near(L1),¬near(L2),¬near(L3),¬touching(T ),
¬touching(B), locationOf (B) = L2,
locationOf (T ) = L1}
Consider a simple planning problem for the Block-and-
Towel World in which the agent must move the blockB from
location L2 to L3. The agent could execute a simple plan as
follows to solve the problem:
pi1 = {reach(B, locationOf (B)),
grasp(B, locationOf (B)),
lift(B, locationOf (B)), carryTo(B,L3), release(B,L3)}
During the course of the plan, the agent touches and holds
the block as it moves it from location L2 to L3. Using a
similar plan, the agent could move the towel to any location,
as well.
Now, consider a more difficult planning problem in which
the agent is asked to move the block from L2 to L3 without
touching it. Given the constraints imposed by the problem,
the goal state, is not reachable and the agent must discover
an alternative way to move the block. To do so, the agent
must uncover states in the worldWt that were previously not
in its subdomain Σ. For example, the agent may learn that
by moving the towel to location L2, the towel “covers” the
block, so it might discover a new predicate covered(o1, o2)
that would prevent it from touching the block. The agent may
also uncover a new action push(o, l1, l2) which would allow
it to push the object along the surface. To uncover new pred-
icates and actions, the agent may have to execute an insight-
ful strategy ωI . Once the agent’s domain has been extended,
the problem becomes a standard planning problem for which
the agent can discover a solution plan for covering the block
with the towel and then pushing both the towel and the block
from location L2 to L3. In order to autonomously resolve
this problem, the agent must be able to recognize when it is
stuck, discover new insights, and build new plans. Addition-
ally, the agent must be able to actually execute this operation
in the real-world. That is, the agent must have suitable robotic
sensory and action mechanisms to locate and grasp and ma-
nipulate the objects.
4.2 Practical Example: Makeshift Screwdriver
Consider the practical example of attaching or fastening
things together, a critical task in many domains, which, de-
pending on the situation, can require resilience to unex-
pected events and resourcefulness in finding solutions. Sup-
pose an agent must affix two blocks from a set of blocks
b = {B1, B2}. In order to do so, the agent has a tool box
containing a set of tools t = {screwdriver, plier, hammer}
and a set of fasteners f = {screw, nail}. In addition,
there are other objects in the agent’s environment o =
{towel, coin,mug, ducttape}. Assume the agent can sense
the following relations (i.e., predicates and their negations)
with respect to the objects 4:
• isAvailable(t): tool t is available to use
• fastenWith(t, f): tool t is designed for fastener f
• grabWith(t): tool t is designed to grab a fastener f
• isHolding(t): agent is holding tool t
• isReachable(t, f): tool t can reach fastener f
• isCoupled(t, f): tool t is coupled to fastener f
• isAttachedTo(f, b1, b2): fastener f is attached to or in-
serted into blocks b1 and b2
• isSecured(f, b1, b2): fastener f is tightly secured into
blocks b1 and b2.
We can also define a set of actions in the agent subdomain
as follows:
• select(t, f): select/grasp a tool t to use with fastener f
precond: {isAvailable(t), fastenWith(t, f)}
effect: {isHolding(t)}
• grab(t, f): Grab a fastener f with tool t.
precond: {isHolding(t), grabWith(t)}
effect: {isCoupled(t, f)}
• placeAndAlign(f, b1, b2): Place and align fastener f ,
and blocks b1 and b2
effect: {isAttachedTo(f, b1, b2)}
• reachAndEngage(t, f): Reach and engage the tool t
with fastener f
precond: {isHolding(t), fastenWith(t, f),
isReachable(t, f)}
effect: {isCoupled(t, f)}
• install(f, t, b1, b2): Install the fastener f with tool t
precond: {isCoupled(t, f), isAttachedTo(f, b1, b2)}
effect: {isSecured(f, b1, b2}
Now suppose a screw has been loosely inserted into
two blocks (isAttachedTo(screw,B1, B2)) and needs
4Given space limitations, we have not presented the entire do-
main represented by this example. Nevertheless, our analysis of the
MacGyver-esque properties should still hold.
to be tightened (¬isSecured(screw,B1, B2)). Tight-
ening a screw would be quite straightforward by per-
forming actions select(), reachAndEngage(), install().
But for some reason the screwdriver has gone missing
(¬isAvailable(screwdriver)).
This is a MacGyver problem because there is no
way for the agent, given its current subdomain of
knowledge, to tighten the screw as the goal state of
isSecured(screw,B1, B2) is unreachable from the agent’s
current context. Hence, the agent must extend its domain.
One approach is to consider one of the non-tool objects, e.g.,
a coin could be used as a screwdriver as well, while a mug or
towel might not.
The agent must be able to switch around variables in
its existing knowledge to expose previously unknown ca-
pabilities of tools. For example, by switching grab(t, f)
to grab(t, o) the agent can now explore the possibility of
grabbing a coin with a plier. Similarly, by relaxing con-
straints on variables in other relations, the agent can perform
a reachAndEngage(o, f) action whereby it can couple a
makeshift tool, namely the coin, with the screw.
What if the screw was in a recessed location and therefore
difficult to access without an elongate arm? While the coin
might fit on the head of the screw, it does not have the nec-
essary elongation and would not be able to reach the screw.
An approach here might be to grab the coin with the plier
and use that assembly to tighten the screw, maybe even with
some additionally duct tape for extra support. As noted ear-
lier, generally, the agent must be able to relax some of the pre-
existing constraints and generate new actions. By exploring
and hypothesizing and then testing each variation, the agent
can expand its domain.
This example, while still relatively simple for humans,
helps us highlight the complexity of resources needed for an
agent to perform the task. Successfully identifying and build-
ing a makeshift screwdriver when a standard screwdriver is
not available shows a degree of resilience to events and au-
tonomy and resourcefulness that we believe to be an impor-
tant component of everyday creativity and intelligence. By
formulating the notion of resourcefulness in this manner, we
can better study the complexity of the cognitive processes and
also computationalize these abilities and even formally mea-
sure them.
Agent Requirements: Intelligence and Physical
Embodiment
When humans solve problems, particularly creative insight
problems, they tend to use various heuristics to simplify the
search space and to identify invariants in the environment that
may or may not be relevant [Knoblich, 2009]. An agent solv-
ing an MGP must possess the ability to execute these types of
heuristics and cognitive strategies. Moreover, MGPs are not
merely problems in the classical planning sense, but require
the ability to discover when a problem is unsolvable from a
planning standpoint and then discover, through environmen-
tal exploration, relevant aspects of its surroundings in order
to extend its domain of knowledge. Both these discoveries in
turn are likely to require additional cognitive resources and
heuristics that allow the agent to make these discoveries ef-
ficiently. Finally, the agent must also be able to remember
this knowledge and be able to, more efficiently, solve future
instances of similar problems.
From a real-world capabilities standpoint, the agent must
possess the sensory and action capabilities to be able to exe-
cute this exploration and discovery process, including grasp-
ing and manipulating unfamiliar objects. These practical ca-
pabilities are not trivial, but in combination with intelligent
reasoning, will provide a clear demonstration of agent auton-
omy while solving practical real-world problems.
These examples provide a sense for the types of planning
problems that might qualify as an MGP. Certain MGPs are
more challenging than others and we will next present a the-
oretical measure for the difficulty of an MGP.
4.3 Optimal Solution and M-Number
Generally, we can assume that a solvable MGP has a best
solution that involves an agent taking the most effective ac-
tions, making the required observations as and when needed
and uncovering a solution using the most elegant strategy. We
formalize these notions by first defining optimal solutions and
then the M-Number, which is the measure of the complexity
of an insightful strategy in the optimal solution.
Definition 10 (Optimal Solutions). Let PM = (Wt, s0, g)
be an MGP for the agent. Let pˆi be an optimal solution plan
to PM . A set of optimal domain modifications is a set of do-
main modifications ∆ˆ is the minimum set of domain modi-
fications needed for the inclusion of actions in the optimal
solution plan pˆi. An optimal solution strategy is a solution
strategy ωˆ = (pˆi, ∆ˆ), where ∆ˆ is a set of optimal domain
modifications.
Definition 11 (M-Number). Let PM = (Wt, s0, g) be an
MGP for the agent. Let Ωˆ = {ωˆ1, . . . , ωˆn} be the set of n
optimal solution strategies. For each ωˆi ∈ Ωˆ, there exists an
insightful strategy ωˆIi ⊆ ωˆi. Let Ωˆ
I = {ωˆI1 , . . . , ωˆ
I
n} be the
set of optimal insightful strategies. The set ΩˆI can be repre-
sented by a program p on some prefix universal Turing ma-
chine capable of listing elements of ΩˆI and halting. We can
then use Kolmogorov complexity of the set of these insight-
ful strategies, K(ΩˆI) := minp∈B∗{|p| : U(p) computes ΩˆI}
[Li and Vita´nyi, 1997]. We define the intrinsic difficulty of the
MGP (M-Number orM) as the Kolmogorov complexity of the
set of optimal insightful strategies ΩˆI ,M = K(ΩˆI).
As we have shown MGP-EXISTENCE is intractable and
measuring the intrinsic difficulty of an MGP is not com-
putable if we use Kolmogorov complexity. Even if we instead
choose to use an alternative and computable approximation to
Kolmogorov complexity (e.g., Normalized Compression Dis-
tance), determining the M-Number is difficult to do as we
must consult an oracle to determine the optimal solution. In
reality, an agent does not know that the problem it is facing is
an MGP and even if it did know this, the agent would have a
tough time determining how well it is doing.
4.4 Measuring Progress and Agent Success
When we challenge each other with creative problems,we of-
ten know if the problem-solver is getting closer (“warmer”) to
the solution. We formalize this idea using Solomonoff Induc-
tion. To do so, we will first designate a “judge” who, based on
a strategy currently executed by the agent, guesses the prob-
ability that, in some finite number of steps, the agent is likely
to have completed an insightful strategy.
Consider an agent performing a strategy ω to attempt to
solve an MGP PM and a judge evaluating the performance of
the agent. The judgemust first attempt to understandwhat the
agent is trying to do. Thus, the judge must first hypothesize
an agent model that is capable of generating ω.
Let the agent be defined by the probability measure µ(ω |
PM ,C), where this measure represents the probability that an
agent generates a strategyω given anMGPPM when in a par-
ticular contextC. The judge does not know µ in advance and
the measure could change depending on the type of agent. For
example, a random agent could have µ(ω) = 2−|ω|, whereas
a MacGyver agent could be represented by a different prob-
ability measure. Not knowing the type of agent, we want
the judge to be able to evaluate as many different types of
agents as possible. There are infinitely many different types
of agents and accordingly infinitely many different hypothe-
ses µ for an agent. Thus, we cannot simply take an expected
value with respect to a uniform distribution, as some hypothe-
ses must be weighed more heavily than others.
Solomonoff devised a universal distribution over a set of
computable hypotheses from the perspective of computability
theory [Solomonoff, 1960]. The universal prior of a hypothe-
sis was defined:
P (µ) ≡
∑
p:U(p,ω)=µ(ω)
2−|p|
The judge applies the principle of Occam’s razor - given
many explanations (in our case hypotheses), the simplest is
the most likely, and we can approximate P (µ) ≡ 2−K(µ),
whereK(µ) is the Kolmogorov complexity of measure µ.
To be able to measure the progress of an agent solving
an MGP, we must be able to define a performance metric
Rµ. In this paper, we do not develop any particular perfor-
mance metric, but suggest that a performance metric be pro-
portional to the level of resourcefulness and creativity of the
agent. Generally, measuring progress may depend on prob-
lem scope, control variables, length and elegance of the solu-
tion and other factors. Nevertheless, a simple measure of this
sort can serve as a placeholder to develop our theory.
We are now ready to define the performance or progress of
an agent solving an MGP.
Definition 12 (Expected Progress). Consider an agent in
context C = (Σti, s0) solving an MGP PM = (W
t, s0, g).
The agent has executed strategy ω comprising actions and
domain modifications. Let U be the space of all programs
that compute a measure of agent resourcefulness. Consider a
judge observing the agent and fully aware of the agent’s con-
text and knowledge and the MGP itself. Let the judge be pre-
fix universal Turing machine U and letK be the Kolmogorov
complexity function. Let the performance metric, which is an
interpretation of the cumulative state of the agent resource-
fulness in solving the MGP, be Rµ. The expected progress of
this agent as adjudicated by the judge is:
M(ω) ≡
∑
µ∈U
2−K(µ) ·Rµ
Now, we are also interested in seeing whether the agent,
given this strategy ω is likely to improve its performance over
the next k actions. The judge will need to predict the contin-
uation of this agent’s strategy taking all possible hypotheses
of the agent’s behavior into account. Let ω+ be a possible
continuation and let a represent concatenation.
M(ωaω+ | ω) =
M(ωaω+)
M(ω)
The judge is a Solomonoff predictor such that the predicted
finite continuation ω+ is likely to be one in which ωaω+ is
less complex in the Kolmogorov sense. The judge measures
the state of the agent’s attempts at solving the MGP and can
also predict how the agent is likely to perform in the future.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In the Apollo 13 space mission, astronauts together with
ground control had to overcome several challenges to bring
the team safely back to Earth [Lovell and Kluger, 2006]. One
of these challenges was controlling carbon dioxide levels
onboard the space craft: “For two days straight [they] had
worked on how to jury-rig the Odysseys canisters to the
Aquariuss life support system. Now, using materials known
to be available onboard the spacecraft – a sock, a plastic bag,
the cover of a flight manual, lots of duct tape, and so on – the
crew assembled a strange contraption and taped it into place.
Carbon dioxide levels immediately began to fall into the safe
range.” [Cass, 2005; Team, 1970].
We proposed the MacGyver Test as a practical alternative
to the Turing Test and as a formal alternative to robotic and
machine learning challenges. The MT does not require any
specific internal mechanism for the agent, but instead focuses
on observed problem-solving behavior akin to the Apollo 13
team. It is flexible and dynamic allowing for measuring a
wide range of agents across various types of problems. It is
based on fundamental notions of set theory, automated plan-
ning, Turing computation, and complexity theory that allow
for a formal measure of task difficulty. AlthoughKolmogorov
complexity and the Solomonoff Induction measures are not
computable, they are formally rigorous and can be substituted
with computable approximations for practical applications.
In future work, we plan to develop more examples of
MGPs and also begin to unpack any interesting aspects of
the problem’s structure, study its complexity and draw com-
parisons between problems. We believe that the MT formally
captures the concept of practical intelligence and everyday
creativity that is quintessentially human and practically help-
ful when designing autonomous agents. Most importantly,
the intent of the MT and the accompanying MGP formalism
is to help guide research by providing a set of mathematically
formal specifications for measuring AI progress based on an
agent’s ability to solve increasingly difficult MGPs. We thus
invite researchers to develop MGPs of varying difficulty and
design agents that can solve them.
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